Rail Baltic - To Vilnius or not to Vilnius, That is the Question

Esa Nurkka, 11.11.2014

Baltic countries eventually managed to sign the shareholders’ agreement for RB Rail on 28th of October in Riga, and media coverage on Rail Baltic has been rather positive ever since. And why not, establishing the Baltic Joint Company looks like a major breakthrough in the negotiations. 
 
Even the geopolitical climate supports the positive interpretation of Rail Baltic’s progress. Russia’s political, economic and military activities are a constant worry for the three Baltic states, who have been card carrying members of EU and NATO since 2004.

Although the Rail Baltic task force has worked hard, their achievements so far have been rather humble. To get the Rail Baltic train on the move, they need to pick up the speed radically! It does not help that the sluggish progress of project Rail Baltic has never been a real concern for the Transport ministries in Latvia and Lithuania.

Who needs Rail Baltic the most?
Estonia stands to gain the most from Rail Baltic. Unlike Latvia and Lithuania, Estonian Railways have practically no east-west business with Russia, and Rail Baltic would offer new business opportunities for both the state owned Eesti Raudtee and the private entrepreneurs operating in the Estonian logistics business.

Latvia used to be the nerve-center for Baltic railways in the Soviet era, and the Latvian Railways still regards the freight trains shuttling between the harbors of the Baltic Sea and Russia as the only viable business. Although the Latvians do not object Rail Baltic, they are doing an excellent job hiding their possible enthusiasm towards it.

The Lithuanian Railways’ primary interest is the east-west axis. In the west there are Port of Klaipeda and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, and in the east Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and China. Although the Lithuanian Railways claim to support Rail Baltic, their support could be described as questionable but volatile.

Conclusion: Estonia wants Rail Baltic, and Latvia does not object it. Vilnius does not actively want or need Rail Baltic (at least north of Kaunas), and their support comes with a price. Lithuanians are eager to capitalize their valuable position as the “strategic gatekeeper” to the European 1435 mm rail network. 

RB Rail: Who’s got the upper hand?
RB Rail’s shareholder agreement was signed on the 28th of October. The photograph taken after the signing ceremony shows, who had the upper hand in October’s negotiations.

Palo, Matiss and Sinkevicius: Who's got the upper hand? (photo LETA/diena.lv)

Lithuanians have proved time and time again that they have not skipped the "getting what you want in a negotiation" class. Once again they persuaded the Estonian and Latvian ministers to sign a shareholders’ agreement including the “Vilnius provision”. Kudos to Mr. Sinkevicius team on that.

However, it is hard to understand the Lithuanians fetish to argue about the Vilnius connection with the other Baltic states. The fate of Lithuania's internal Kaunas-Vilnius connections’ financing lies completely on the hands of the European Council, never mind how much or how little Estonia and Latvia support it. Hopefully the Lithuanian mastery of negotiation tactics will be next time used in Brussels, to the benefit of Rail Baltic and Baltic states.

Latvian Minister of Transport Mr. Matiss was optimistic after the signing ceremony: “I am convinced that the signing of the Contract will ensure the implementation of Rail Baltica II.”  But to be honest, starting a statement with “I am convinced” does not sound too convincing.

Another shade of the Latvian attitude towards Rail Baltic can be heard in the comments of Latvian Rail Baltic manager Dins Merirands, who did not want to rule out a partial failure of the project. Mr. Merirands pointed out that in a tripartite project like Rail Baltic there is always a risk that the “will” to finish the project may not be always shared by all the participants. But then again, Mr. Merirands reasoned that everyone should work hard in the Rail Baltic project, in order to get at least something done. “Even the separate elements of this infrastructure could be used for the benefit and the purpose of what they were built for.” (Mr. Merirands comments are at 23 minutes of this video recording, taped at the Globālās transporta kustības vīzija 2050 conference in Riga on the 14th of September 2014).

Estonian Minister of transport Urve Palo was more or less forced to sign the shareholder’s agreement, as that was the only way to move forward with the project. After the signing ceremony Ms. Palo did not comment on the past problems of the project, and opted to concentrate on the future instead. She stated that the most urgent tasks for RB Rail are to prepare the financing application ASAP, contact the European Commission, prepare the business plan and evaluate the benefits of the project.

It is an excellent idea to contact European Commission, and ask whether all the planned adjustments to project plan are acceptable for the financier. If RB Rail’s finance application is made according to the specifics that have been presented in the ministerial declarations and joint statements, the EC will need to consider issues like “Does it matter who owns the infrastructure, once it has been constructed using EU financing?” and “Is it all right if the 1435 mm 240 km/h railway from Tallinn leads to Vilnius, instead of Poland?”. 

The European Commission and the Vilnius Issue

Lithuania has been advocating the 1435 mm Kaunas-Vilnius connection since summer 2013, and there is nothing wrong with that. It’s just that managing the plain north-south Rail Baltic 2 from Tallinn to the Polish border is a demending task, and addition of Kaunas-Vilnius connection to the already complex and multi-dimensional project could turn it into a Mission impossible.

AECOM’s extensive Feasibility study from 2011 found project Rail Baltic to be feasible and eligible for EU funding, but the feasibility was based on assumption of a double track 240 km/h railway from Tallinn all the way down to the Polish border. Currently the “bottom 100 km” from Kaunas to the Polish border is a slow speed single track connection, with only a fraction of the capacity that would be required to digest the cargo and passenger flows between Kaunas to Europe.

Claiming that the Tallinn-Riga-Kaunas-Vilnius version of Rail Baltic fits the “Connecting Europe” agenda is a tough act. If there was a “Connecting Vilnius Facility”, that would be a natural source of funding for this twisted version of Rail Baltic.    

However credible or incredible the Lithuanians’ arguments for a new Kaunas-Vilnius track are, the state of the current 1520 mm connection between Kaunas and Vilnius should also be considered. It is the highest quality railway in Lithuania at the moment, and it would serve as an ideal connection for Kaunas area’s intermodal terminals and future Rail Baltic connections to north and south. This is how Lithuanian Railways illustrates the dramatic improvement in the 1520 mm connection between Kaunas and Vilnius, achieved with the help of EU funding:

Conclusion: To Vilnius or not to Vilnius?

The Vilnius issue has delayed Rail Baltic, and it looks like the problem might possibly have been solved now. However, moments of optimism have often been followed by a return to harsh reality. Here's a recap of the situation:

• Lithuania wants to add Kaunas-Vilnius connection to the Rail Baltic 2 project to maximize its stake of EU financing.
• Estonia and Latvia have not opposed the idea of constructing a 1435 mm railway from Kaunas to Vilnius per se, but their logical view has been that there is no reason to complicate the already daunting project Rail Baltic. Kaunas-Vilnius is purely Lithuania's domestic issue, and they should discuss it directly with Brussels.
• Eventually a compromise was reached, and RB Rail's shareholders' agreement was signed in October. Lithuania was happy because the "Vilnius provision" was included in the agreement after onerous negotiations, while Estonia and Latvia were probably pleased with the “each country will co-finance the railway construction only within its own territory” clause added to the agreement.

A high ranking official from the Lithuanian Ministry of Transport confirmed me last week, that “regardless of the EC financing decisions for the Kaunas-Vilnius railway, there is no risk for the construction of Kaunas-Latvia section”. If we take that comment at face value, the construction of Rail Baltic's Kaunas-Latvia section will not be affected, even if the European Commission would completely turn down the application for Kaunas-Vilnius financing. That would be major progress, since only last June the Lithuanian Minister of Transport, Mr. Rimantas Sinkevicus linked together the financing decision of Kaunas-Vilnius and the construction of Kaunas-Latvia sections.

The European Commission has been following this Baltic mud wrestling act mostly on the sidelines. Considering that we are talking about a 4+ Billion euros project, the EC might consider taking a bit more vocal role. Giving clear guidelines of what can and what can not be included in the Rail Baltic 2 finance application would help. Creating a sense of urgency and instigating the fear of missing the 3 Billion euros financing to other TEN-T Priority Projects would help keep the Rail Baltic folks in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius well motivated and focused. Money is the ultimate motivator.

“The Rail Baltic Task Force continue working on the establishment of the Rail Baltic Joint Venture as mandated by the ministers” (Source: Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Latvia)

Disclaimer

This article is based mostly on information available on public internet sites. If you are interested in more in-depth analysis on Rail Baltic issues, do not hesitate to contact me by e-mail, esa.nurkka@gmail.com.

Rail Baltic – Autumn up-date

(This is an English language summary of recent Finnish language Rail Baltic monitoring comments and analysis from Baltirail website.)
Rail Baltic – Autumn up-date

(Esa Nurkka, 15.10.2014)

Baltic countries were supposed to launch the RB Rail joint company on 23rd of August in Riga, as a part of Baltic Way 25th anniversary celebration. Unfortunately the signing ceremony had to be called off. Since then the schedule for establishing the Baltic joint company has been adjusted a few times, and further readjustments might be on the way.

Adjustments to Rail Baltic’s schedule

23.8.2014 The Baltic joint company was not established, but the Lithuanian Minister of Transport Rimantas Sinkevicius stated that the delay was only due to technicalities, according to him “the shareholders’ agreement had been prepared and the talks were over.” At the time, Mr Sinkevicius believed that the joint company could be launched already in September, as soon as the Estonians had established their national Rail Baltic company.

3.10.2014 Estonian Minister of Transport, Ms. Urve Palo announced the establishment of Rail Baltic Estonia OÜ, and appointed Mr. Indrek Orav as the head of the company. Already on October the 4th Transport Minister of Latvia Anrijs Matijss stated that the Baltic joint company would be established in Riga already in mid-October.

13.10.2014 Latvian Transport Minister Matiss readjusted the date of the signing ceremony, it was now scheduled to Tuesday 28.10.2014. Depending on the source, the shareholders’ agreement “will be signed” or “is planned to be signed” on October the 28th.

According to Baltic News Service, even Estonian Economic Ministry’s adviser Rasmus Ruuda had confirmed that Estonia was indeed ready to sign the shareholders’ agreement. Unfortunately we do not know the exact background of Mr. Ruuda’s comment. He may have answered to a question like “Now that Rail Baltic Estonia OÜ has finally been established, do you have the technical ability to sign RB Rail’s shareholders’ agreement?” or maybe even “Has Estonia agreed with Latvia and Lithuania on the exact wording of the shareholders’ agreement, and is thus ready to sign?”

14.10.2014 Lithuanian Rail Baltic Statyba's CEO Dainius Budrys visited Panevezys municipality to discuss Rail Baltic's impact to Panevezys area. Nothing wrong with that, but according to local newspaper article, Mr Budrys had told that the financing application for EU funds would be submitted only in 2016. Hopefully that does not present the official view of the Lithuanian Rail Baltic team.

The Lithuanian views

Lithuania has been actively spreading its own views on Rail Baltic and rail transportation. Here are some recent examples:

8.10.2014 Lithuania released a 40 minutes long Youtube video, showing a helicopter view of 101 kilometers of Rail Baltic track and construction sites between Kaunas and Polish border. According to Lithuanian Railways, more than 50 % of the work has already been done:



Maybe the purpose of this video was to demonstrate that the 373 million euros of EU and NIB funding are being well spent. As an interesting side note, the Lithuanian Railways’ fully owned infra subsidiary UAB Geležinkelio Tiesimo Centras generated record profits in 2013, driven by strong revenue growth from Rail Baltic projects. That is a shrewd way to cover a part of internal funding that is required in EU projects.

9.10.2014 Vice-Minister of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Lithuania Arijandas Šliupas stated, that Lithuania embraces EU’s aim to optimize management of rail infrastructure as well as preserve its competitiveness. However, Lithuania wants to hang on to a model, where one state-owned company can manage both infrastructure and passenger and freight transportation without competition also in the future. This might become a problem, when the management issues of Rail Baltic are negotiated. 

13.10.2014 Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Lithuania published a “feasibility study” on Kaunas-Vilnius connection‘s affect to Rail Baltica project. The project was prepared by AECOM, and it found “great potential” in connecting Vilnius and Kaunas city centers as well as Vilnius and Kaunas airports with a 1435 mm railway. The cost of the connection was estimated at 850 million euros, and according to Minister of Transport and Communications in Lithuania Rimantas Sinkevicius “we shall submit the application [for EU’s structural funds] now, but it is difficult to expect funding in this [2014-2020] period”. Mr. Sinkevicius did not clarify, whether “we” in his comment referred to Lithuania or the Baltic joint company. 
   

How about Latvia?

Latvian Railways is not interested in Rail Baltic. Latvijas Dzelzcelss (LDz) CEO Ugis Magonis stated in August, that Rail Baltic might be financially feasible for Estonia, but not for Latvia. In September Magonis reiterated his view at Globālās transporta kustības vīzija 2050 seminar, where he stated that for LDz only the east-west -direction is meaningful and “Russia is the market”. Latvian Ministry of Transport seems to be of the same view, at least at the above-mentioned seminar a Transport Ministry spokesman very carefully avoided committing too keenly on Rail Baltic.

In order to get the Rail Baltic train finally moving…

There are only four months to set up the RB Rail company in Riga, prepare the common finance application and submit it to CEF. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should now prioritize the “original” Rail Baltic 2 railway, the one that leads from Tallinn via Riga and Kaunas to Polish border.

If Kaunas-Vilnius -connection cannot be set aside for a while, it should be handled as a completely separate issue. Call it Rail Baltic 3, or whatever. Although Kaunas-Vilnius connection with its airport loops is purely Lithuania’s internal project, Estonia and Latvia are free to support its applications for EU funding as much as they want to. However, Estonia and Latvia are ever-never going to commit themselves to obtaining a positive financing decision for Kaunas-Vilnius connection from Brussels. If Lithuania does not recognize this, the whole process is a waste of time and money.

If it becomes obvious that the shareholders’ agreement cannot be signed by the end of October, the Baltic countries should not start blaming each other for the situation. Maybe European Commission officials could take a stronger role in the negotiations, and help the Baltic countries understand what can be done and what cannot be done.

Although the views presented in this article are not very optimistic, and at times they might even be cynical, I still do hope that RB Rail will be established during 2014 and one common finance application will be submitted to CEF in January 2015. Missing the current financing window would paralyze or possibly even kill the whole project, and that would mark a truly bad start for Lithuania as a new euro country.

Rail Baltic - Connecting Europe or Connecting Vilnius? (part 3/3)

Rail Baltic - Connecting Europe or Connecting Vilnius?

Esa Nurkka, 12.9.2014

Project Rail Baltic’s target is to link the three Baltic countries and Finland to the European 1435 mm rail network in Poland and the rest of Europe. The first part of the project (Rail Baltic 1) involved refurbishing the existing 1520 mm track in Baltic, and the second part (Rail Baltic 2) consists of the construction of a new north-south double track 1435 mm railway through Baltic.

Rail Baltic in Estonia
Estonia has been evaluating different route options and doing preparatory work like Environmental impact assessments and preliminary design of construction work. Estonian government has also authorized Minister Urve Palo to set up a Rail Baltica holding company, which will be the shareholder of the Baltic joint company. Considering the fact that establishing the Baltic joint company has been “under construction” for two years, the project has proceeded in Estonia satisfactorily.

Rail Baltic in Latvia
Situation is the same as in Estonia, preparatory work has been done. The transport ministry of Latvia has confirmed its readiness for the Baltic joint company, and established a holding company to own one third of the Baltic joint company.

Rail Baltic in Lithuania, from Latvian border to Kaunas
The Lithuanian government decided in June 2014 to align Rail Baltic from Latvian border to Kaunas through Panevezys (the eastern option) instead of Siuaulia (the western option). Unfortunately Prime Minister Sinkevicius pointed out that, depending on the success of Kaunas-Vilnius line’s EU financing application, the decision might be reconsidered. The problem with this comment is, that no decision from Brussels is to be expected until 2017, at the earliest.

Rail Baltic in Lithuania, from Kaunas to Polish border
First the good news. The European gauge railway from Polish border to Kaunas should be finished already in 2015. Some parts of the track were constructed in 2011, and the work was restarted in 2013. There are currently 5 general contractors, who are busy working on the track south of Kaunas. The 373 million euros project is being financed by Nordic Investment Bank, EU structural funds and the Lithuanian Railways.

This is basically good news, but… AECOM’s feasibility study from 2011 suggested a new dual track 1435 mm railway from Tallinn all the way down to Polish/Lithuanian border. However, in this section Lithuania opted to combine refurbishing of old 1520 mm track and construction of a new 1435 mm track.

As we can see in the video, the old 1520 railway has many twists and turns. Building a new 1435 mm railway alongside the old one means, that the maximum speed will be only 120 km/h for passenger trains and 80 km/h for freight trains.



At the moment Lithuanian Railways is looking for tenders for the design and technical construction supervision of Rail Baltica section Rokai – Palemonas – Kaunas. According to the tender document, the project’s targets can be achieved “either by having a double railway line with the 1435mm track inside the 1520mm track or the 1435mm one being built by the side of the 1520mm one”.

That sounds slightly worrying, and a bit more ambitious target for the project would have been advisable. When a double track 240 km/h railway from Tallinn transforms in Kaunas into a single track 120 km/h railway, a severe bottleneck is created. If transportation flows from Vilnius direction are squeezed into the same channel, due to dual-gauge portions of the railway, the situation gets even worse.

A 7 km dual gauge 1435/1520 mm track from Mockava to Sestokai was finished already in 2011

Although the southern section of Rail Baltic looks like a bottleneck, it is still better than no connection at all. The Polish part of Rail Baltic is going to be an upgraded version of an old 1435 mm gauge track, and the top speed over there is going to be 160 km/h. Thus the most optimistic scenarios about travel time from Tallinn to Warsaw and Berlin will not be reality in 2024, when the Baltic part of Rail Baltic should be finished.

Rail Baltic in Lithuania, from Kaunas to Vilnius?
This is how project Rail Baltic looked like in 2007. The alignment of the route has evolved over the years, but the basic reasoning behind the project is still the same.



Even in 2012 the vision was clear. In this video Lithuania’s erstwhile Minister of Transport Eligijus Masiulis describes the benefits and potential of developing intermodal services in Kaunas and smaller cities south of Kaunas, like Marijampole, Sestokai and Mockava. 



Only in 2013 Lithuania came up with the idea of adding Vilnius to Rail Baltic. It started as a humble wish, but in September Lithuanian Ministry of Transport managed to lure Estonian and Latvian ministers into signing a joint declaration, where the ministers, more or less, agreed to adding Vilnius into Rail Baltic and getting 85 % financing for it from Connecting Europe Facility. Unfortunately the ministers had no authority to make such decisions.

In October 2013 Lithuania released a Rail Baltica News video update, where they subtly and skillfully forwarded the message, that Vilnius would indeed be a part of Rail Baltic. The style of the video is a hilarious mix of the Muppet Show and a Hunger Games movie trailer, but the message delivered by the host of the video is, albeit hidden underneath rather complex grammatical structures, clear:

"Ministers responsible for the transport from five countries signed a declaration, in which they agreed in regards to the implementation of the second stage of the Rail Baltica project, also known as Rail Baltica 2, where European standard tracks will stretch across Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland, and as is planned in the white paper, will connect the capital cities of all the nations mentioned above."

As the deadline for setting up the Baltic joint company was missed on 1.1.2014, Lithuania had to change tactics. During spring and early summer 2014 Lithuanians delivered numerous fake positive comments about the progress of Rail Baltic negotiations, and eventually managed to fool Prime Ministers of Estonia and Latvia to sign another Joint statement on 21.6.2014. And once again, the ministers agreed that it would be cool to get financing for Kaunas-Vilnius connection from the Connecting Europe Facility.

How Lithuanians justify their “Connecting Vilnius” agenda in the Rail Baltica project
“According to the white paper, Rail Baltic is meant to connect all the Capital cities.” 
However: Also Finland and Finnish capital Helsinki have been part of Rail Baltic from day one. If Helsinki is connected to Rail Baltic only via ferry, the existing 1520 mm railway from Kaunas to Vilnius should do as well. No-one has (seriously) demanded that Helsinki should be connected to Rail Baltic with a fixed 1435 mm railway as a part of the current Rail Baltic PP27 project. Unless you believe in the official Rail Baltica web page managed by Lithuanian Railways, which boldly suggests a railway bridge from Tallinn to Helsinki.

“Vilnius produces 40 % of GDP in Lithuania.”
However: Critics claim that a major part of Vilnius’ GDP derives from administration. 

“Lithuania needs to protect its national interest, it is just sensible to try maximize the portion of EU funding for the project.”
However: The governments of three Baltic countries committed to the basic terms of this project already in 2011.  

“Lithuania is a sovereign state and will not let Latvians and Estonians decide where and when to build railway lines.” or “We have a decision adopted by Seimas...”
However: It’s not about Estonia and Latvia, or Seimas. The money comes from the European Commission, and they decide how that money should be spent.

Some facts about Lithuania

• Lithuania is a member EU (not the Comecon) and NATO (not The Warsaw Pact), and Lithuania intends to adopt Euro (not Ruble) in the beginning of 2015.
• Lithuania’s geographical position may be problematic in war-time, but it is good for business. Any fluent landline connection from north to continental Europe, or from the Baltic Sea (or Kaliningrad) to East, goes via Lithuania.
• The railway branches Kiev–Minsk–Vilnius–Klaipeda and Kaunas–Kaliningrad carry about 90% of all railway transit cargo and about 70% of the railway passenger transportation in Lithuania.
• The current 1520 mm railway between Kaunas and Vilnius is the best one there is in Lithuania.
• Lithuanians know how to bargain.

Some conclusions

• Lithuania wants to prioritize a 1435 mm branch line from Kaunas to Vilnius, while the capacity of the 1435 mm railway between Kaunas and the Polish border is only a fraction of what it was supposed to be. Thus AECOM's Rail Baltic feasibility calculations are not valid. A smooth connection to Europe was the basic idea behind Rail Baltic, but now it seems that Estonians and Latvians might have to settle with a smooth connection to Vilnius.
• The Baltic countries hope to sign the shareholders’ agreement for RB Rail in October, and submit the finance application to Brussels immediately thereafter. Hopefully that happens. However, if the common joint company cannot be established, submitting separate finance applications would be a bad idea. But then again, the officials at Connecting Europe Facility would probably turn down separate applications anyway.
• It is hard to say what are the real reasons behind Lithuania’s reluctance towards Rail Baltic, but here are some possible explanations:

• Constructing a branch line to Vilnius might nevertheless be a good idea, although no-one outside Vilnius understands it at this moment.

• Lithuania may be just bargaining for a bigger portion of the EU financing of Rail Baltic.

• Maybe politics are involved. Russia does have a lot of influence in Lithuanian Railways (and thus The Ministry of Transport), and maybe the historical tensions between Kaunas and Vilnius could also play a role. It is a funny coincidence, that although Lithuania has disagreed on most things about Rail Baltic, they have never contested the decision to establish the Baltic RB Rail company in Riga. Of course, the natural Lithuanian alternative for Riga would be Kaunas, and that is something that the Lithuanian Transport Ministry, with head quarters in Vilnius, would not like. 

• There has been some speculation about Lithuanian Railways' strategic plan to become the logistic center for transportation to North-Western Russia and St. Petersburg area. If that plan is based solely on 1520 mm railway lines, Rail Baltic might be a competitor for it. But on the other hand, if Lithuanian Railways' future strategy is founded on just a single  customer, they might need to take a look around. Lithuanian Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Energy could educate the Ministry of Transport about the pros and cons of operating with just a single customer or supplier.

Some Youtube videos on Rail Baltic

23.5.2013 MEP Roberts Zile from Latvia and MEP Ivari Padar from Estonia discuss Rail Baltic:

2.10.2013 A Lithuanian language presentation on Rail Baltic:


19.2.2014 A Lithuanian current affairs program about Rail Baltic:


26.5.2014 Helicopter footage from Rail Baltic construction in Marijampoléje:


1.8.2014 Helicopter footage from Rail Baltic construction in Mauručiai:

Rail Baltic – August up-date

(There have recently been some Latvian and Lithuanian visitors to Baltirail website, who are probably using Google translate to interpret the Finnish language comments on Rail Baltic. Unfortunately Google and other web-translators speak rather bad Finnish. For example, the concise Finnish word “allekirjoittamattomuus” translates into English as “state of not being signed by anyone”, while “allekirjoittelemattomuus” would be “state of not being randomly signed by anyone”.  That’s plain and simple, but too difficult for Google translate to master. Here is a brief English launguage summary of the recent Rail Baltic monitoring comments from Baltirail website.)

Rail Baltic – August up-date

(Esa Nurkka 25.8.2014)

When it comes to recent Rail Baltic issues, the point is “allekirjoittamattomuus”, i.e. nothing was signed in Riga last weekend. Neither randomly nor specifically on purpose. The Baltic Prime Ministers did meet at the Baltic Way 25th anniversary celebration and they did participate a Rail Baltic presentation, and that’s it.

As all the previous deadlines for establishing RB Rail (the tripartite Rail Baltic joint company to be founded in Riga) have been missed, the latest unofficial target for signing the Shareholder’s Agreement had been set at 23.8.2014. That would have been most convenient: Signing the documents in Riga at Baltic Way 25th anniversary celebration, and submitting the finance application to EU in September.

That was a good plan, but it did not work out. On Friday 22.4.2014 Lithuania’s minister of transport Rimantas Sinkevičius announced that the joint company would not be established on Saturday. This raises some questions.

The Baltic Way 25 event was in Latvia, and for some reason Lithuania’s minister of transport Rimantas Sinkevičius decided to announce, that the joint company could not be established as of yet. According to Sinkevičius the reason for the delay was that Estonians had not set up their national Rail Baltic company. But in real life, Estonia had announced establishing OU Rail Baltic Estonia already on 15.8.2014, as anyone with an internet connection could have googled. We are talking about a 4 billion euros project here, and one would think that monitoring the environment at least occasionally would be a natural part of managing such a project. You know, just write “Rail Baltic” to Google and see what comes up.

It is indeed possible that the Lithuanian Ministry of Transport might have missed that piece of news completely, but that is nevertheless unlikely. But then, why would they have given such a statement? Did they really try to repeat their old trick for a third time in a row?

• September 2013: The Baltic transport ministers were supposed to sign a joint statement about Rail Baltic. Just before the signing ceremony Lithuania announced that the ceremony would be cancelled, due to different views on adding the Kaunas-Vilnius connection to the project. Estonian and Latvian ministers gave up, and agreed to sign a paper with Vilnius connection mentioned in it.
• June 2014: The Baltic Prime Ministers were supposed to sign a joint declaration on Rail Baltic. On the previous evening Lithuanians stated that the ceremony will be cancelled, unless the Vilnius connection was added to the statement. The Estonian and Latvian prime ministers capitulated, and signed a declaration with Vilnius connection mentioned in it.
• August 2014: The Baltic Prime Ministers were supposed to announce the establishment of the RB Rail joint company during the Baltic Way 25th Anniversary celebration. Just one day before the event Lithuania announced that RB Rail cannot be established yet, blaming Estonians’ sluggishness as the reason for the delay. That sounds rather suspicious, so let’s do some conspiracy theoretizing. What if the Lithuanians were hoping that Estonia would have countered to Lithuanians’ accusation with a comment like “Come on, we established OU Rail Baltic Estonia already last week”. And Lithuanians’ response would have been: “Hey that’s great, we actually have the shareholders' agreement here, no need to read it through, just sign on the dotted line, please!”

Both Lithuanians and Latvians have now stated that the finance application should be submitted to EU in October. We have not heard any meaningful comments directly from Estonians yet, only hearsay from Vilnius. Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevičius has claimed, that his Estonian colleague Taavi Roivas had promised that the Estonian company would be ready in the near future.

Unfortunately the real problem is not setting up a company, and neither is it in “finding the proper wording” for the shareholders’ agreement. The challenge is still in the content of the joint company’s shareholders’ agreement, and what it says about the Kaunas-Vilnius connection. The whole thing boils down to two basic question:  

1. Who should pay the bill for the construction of Kaunas-Vilnius 1435 mm European gauge railway, if EU finds it to be not entitled to EU financing, and
2. How (and why) does this relate to the construction of Rail Baltic 2 between Tallinn and Kaunas?

Rail Baltic – To Deal or Not to Deal? (part 2/3)

(This article has not been published elsewhere)

Rail Baltic – To Deal or Not to Deal?

Esa Nurkka 8.8.2014

Project Rail Baltic was created to close the gap between the European 1435 mm rail network and the 1520 mm rail network in the north. The Baltic Prime Ministers and Transport Ministers agreed in 2011, that a Baltic joint venture is needed to coordinate the project and to submit a joint finance application to European Commission.

A brief history of Rail Baltic agreements, declarations and statements in 2011-2014
After initial harmony and mutual understanding in 2011, the project has proceeded sluggishly. Ministers have signed several political papers, but these statements and declarations have failed to speed up the project. The Baltic joint venture is yet to be established.

Here is a summary of ministerial activities:

• 10.11.2011: The three Baltic Prime Ministers agreed to establish a joint venture by the end of 2012.
• 7.12.2011: Transport ministers of the three Baltic states signed a protocol of intentions for further development activities of the "Rail Baltica" railway route.
• (31.12.2012 The joint venture was not established.)
• 16.9.2013: Transport ministers of the three Baltic states signed a joint declaration, where they agreed to coordinate the delivery of the draft Shareholders’ Agreement and the draft Statute to be signed by 1st January 2014.
• (1.1.2014: The joint venture was not established.)
• 21.6.2014: The Prime Ministers of Baltic countries signed a joint statement, where they agreed to promptly take all necessary steps at national level in order to approve and sign the Shareholders’ Agreement and establish the Rail Baltic Joint venture as soon as possible.

Selected Rail Baltic deadlines and targeted schedules, as communicated in 2014
The two official deadlines for establishing the Rail Baltic joint venture (31.12.2012 and 1.1.2014) were both missed. Since then only unofficial targets for the project schedule have been expressed, and the picture is extremely hazy. No-one seems to know nothing.

Here is a selection of schedular expectations, as expressed during the first half of 2014:

• 28.1.2014: “Perhaps we could set up a joint venture as soon as April [2014]” (Dainius Budrys, the CEO of Rail Baltica Statyba in Lithuania)
• 4.2.2014: “Additional questions have surfaced in Rail Baltica project. They are related to Lithuania’s wish to add Vilnius to the project. This is why it has been decided to postpone the foundation of a joint enterprise until March [2014].” (Ilze Aleksandrovica, deputy State Secretary of Transport Ministry of Latvia)
• 4.2.2014: “If the joint venture is not set up by the end of February [2014], it will not be possible to submit a funding proposal by the end of May [2014], which means that no funding allocation will be made in the first round.” (Andrus Ansip, Prime Minister of Estonia)
• 14.2.2014: “It is very important for all three Baltic states to agree on this project to prepare and submit an application for the EU financing by 2016." (Prime Minister Butkevičius and President Straujuma of Lithuania)
• 21.2.2014: “The shareholders' agreement for the joint venture should be signed over the next few months.” (Arenijus Jackus, director of the Lithuanian Transport Ministry’s Development and International Relations Department)
• 26.2.2014: “We are getting very close on establishing a joint venture.” (Arenijus Jackus, director of the Lithuanian Transport Ministry’s Development and International Relations Department)
• 27.2.2014: “The request for funding will be submitted to the European Commission in 2015, so construction of the railroad could begin in 2016.” (Anrijs Matiss, Transport Minister of Latvia)
• 2.5.2014: “…those studies [the feasibility study on the Kaunas-Vilnius –connection] are expected to be completed by the end of the year [2014], but that could mean the Rail Baltic project on the whole will be pushed into the future.” (Arijandas Šliupas, Lithuanian Deputy Transport Minister)
• 20.5.2014: “…the Ministers [Urve Palo of Estonia and Rimantas Sinkevicius of Lithuania] agreed that in order to ensure the necessary funding for the project, negotiations on the technical part of the joint venture establishment should be completed, and shareholders agreement signed as soon as possible.” (Lithuanian Ministry of Transport)
• 21.5.2014: “I think what we agreed today that we will go further as fast as possible in the joint venture establishment. In the [shareholders'] agreement, we will find an appropriate wording [to ensure] that in the next stage [of the project] Vilnius is an essential part of Rail Baltica as well.” (Taavi Roivas, Prime Minister of Estonia)
• 10.6.2014: …asked when the shareholders' agreement will be coordinated and the joint enterprise is established, the minister replied this will be done by the end of June [2014]. (Rimantas Sinkevicius, Prime Minister of Lithuania)
• 16.6.2014:  “The agreement was being negotiated at the deputy minister level and representatives have finally reached a consensus… I hope that we will have the final draft shareholders’ agreement on Wednesday [18.6.2014]” (Arenijus Jackus, the head of Lithuania’s negotiation group)
• 18.6.2014: “… Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia agreed on almost all parts of the contract, including the Vilnius connection. However, he said, Vilnius connection funding issue is still unresolved, because it requires changes to some of the EU legislation. According to the Minister, the legislation on the funding could be reviewed in 2017.” (Rimantas Sinkevicius, Prime Minister of Lithuania) 
• 4.7.2014: “The agreement between Baltic countries to set up a joint venture is a huge thing. By now the things are at such a stage that governments of the three countries would have to approve the document so that before the end of February 2015 a joint Rail Baltic financing request could be submitted to the European Commission.” (Urve Palo, Transport Minister of Estonia)

Why is the Baltic joint venture needed?
In their 21.6.2014 Joint Statement, the Baltic Prime Ministers “stressed the importance to prepare and submit the joint Rail Baltic/Rail Baltica CEF application for the first CEF call for the project proposals to be opened in from September 2014 through February 2014”. The joint CEF application can only be submitted after the joint company has been established

Although the Prime Ministers seemed to support Baltic joint activities, there are very few reasons for optimism. As long as Lithuania sticks to its claim, that Estonia and Latvia should actually commit to seeking and obtaining European funding for the Vilnius connection, we can forget about the Baltic joint venture. Estonia and Latvia cannot commit to such financing, and thus the Baltic joint venture cannot be established anytime soon.

If the Baltic joint venture will not be set up in the coming months, how about Plan B?

Plan B: Separate financing applications.
Already in 2013 there was speculation, that Estonia and Latvia might set up the Baltic joint company in Riga by themselves, and submit the CEF financing application. Lithuania could join in later. This has always sounded like a bad idea, and after having witnessed the progress/regress of project Rail Baltic in 2014, the idea of leaving Lithuania the option to join the project later, sounds like a surefire recipe for disaster.

A couple of weeks ago Arijandas Sliupas, the Deputy Transport Minister of Lithuania, hinted that all three Baltic states might submit separate finance applications for CEF. From politicians' point-of-view that might be a nice way to save their faces on short term, but what would that mean for the project?

Estonia and Latvia might take care of their own sections of Rail Baltic, but could they rely on Lithuania taking care of the southern part of Rail Baltic? Although the money and the funding terms originate from Brussels, Lithuania has opted to argue with Estonia and Latvia and justify this behavior with Lithuania's national interest.

Here are some comments from Lithuania, which reflect the Vilnius attitude towards the Rail Baltic project:

• 13.1.2014 “We have a decision adopted by the Seimas [from December 2013] that Vilnius is part of Rail Baltica. Therefore, I do not even know how this issue should be discussed. We are a sovereign state and no one should tell us where to build a railway line.” (Arenijus Jackus, director of the Lithuanian Transport Ministry’s Development and International Relations Department)
• 22.1.2014 "Neither Estonia nor Latvia will be able to join the European railroad network without Lithuania, this is very important to them." (Rimantas Sinkevicius, Lithuanian Transport and Communications Minister)
• 24.1.2014 “The aim of the company [Rail Baltica Statyba of Lithuania] is to supervise the creation of the new public infrastructure and to defend the state's public interest in accordance with the Lithuanian laws.” (Dainius Budrys, CEO of the Rail Baltica Statyba)
• 2.4.2014 “Estonia and Latvia agree to Vilnius being made an integral part of Rail Baltica, but they propose to make the final decision later, after carrying out certain studies and analyses. Moreover, Latvia together with Estonia would decide where and how infrastructure in Lithuania would be built. We cannot agree to that.” (Arenijus Jackus, director of the Lithuanian Transport Ministry’s Development and International Relations Department)
• 11.7.2014 "I think that the successful completion of the negotiations in the near future will lead to a common Baltic financing application, but how soon it will be done - depends on the Latvians and Estonians.” (Dainius Budrys, CEO of the Rail Baltica Statyba)

Yet another problem might be lurking in the Brussels. It was, after all, European Commission and Connecting Europe Facility, who wanted the project to be handled by one entity. If the three Baltic countries can’t even deliver a common finance application, how could the CEF accept three separate applications?

Conclusion
Connecting Europe Facility’s first call for transport sector’s finance proposals runs from September 2014 to February 2015. Despite the mostly positive tone of Rail Baltic news reports, it’s hard to see how Baltic countries could submit a common financing request in that time frame.

Anything short of (1) signing the shareholder agreement, (2) setting up the RB Rail joint company in Riga and (3) submitting one common finance application for CEF by the end of September 2014 is a disappointment. Appealing to the fact that the absolute deadline for finance application is only in February 2015, is lame. If the shareholder agreement cannot be signed now, how could it become any easier half a year later?

Disclaimer: All the comments and views presented in this article are based solely on information available on public internet sites.

Project Rail Baltic - Now or Never? (part 1/3)

I wrote a brief report on the past 12 months of project Rail Baltic. The text was translated into Lithuanian language, and it was published on 11.7.2014 in the Lithuanian business daily Verslo žinios. All the comments and conclusions presented in the article are based on information that is available in public internet sites. 

As Verslo žinios operates only on Lithuanian language, I will publish the original English language script here. I have also added some links to the sources of information. Further Finnish language comments on Rail Baltic and other related issues can also be found at Baltirail Association's web site.

Project Rail Baltic - Now or Never?

Esa Nurkka 11.7.2014 (originally published in Verslo žinios)
Prime ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania met on 21 June 2014 in Tallinn to review the progress of Rail Baltic project. After the meeting the prime ministers signed a joint statement, where they reiterated, recognized and welcomed various Rail Baltic related issues. The news headlines after the meeting were positive, but reality is much harsher. There is a considerable risk that establishing the Rail Baltic joint company could be delayed to indefinite future.

Rail Baltic is important for Europe
The European Union’s transport infrastructure policy aims to close the gaps between Member States' transport networks and remove bottlenecks that hamper the smooth functioning of the internal market. Rail Baltic is one of the European Commission’s TEN-T Priority Projects, and for that reason up to 85 % of Rail Baltic’s 3.6 Billion euros budget could be financed from the European Cohesion Fund.

As President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso puts it: “Rail Baltic is one of the key projects in the pan-European Transport Networks policy. No other project originating from the Baltic States can show an added value for the entire EU that could come close.” Rail Baltic is important for, not just Lithuania or Baltic, but for the whole Europe.

Rail Baltic would be important for Finland, too. About 80 % of Finland’s foreign trade is transported in ships, and a good part of that volume could be transported by rail. On longer term the possible melting of polar ice and opening of The Northern Sea Route between Europe and Asia could add to Rail Baltic’s volumes remarkably.

Rail Baltic train is moving, but slowly
Rail Baltic was chosen as one of TEN-T Priority Projects already in 2005, and the real work started in 2012. The project and its financing decisions are based on AECOM’s extensive Rail Baltic feasibility study from 2011, which suggests a straight-forward Tallinn-Riga-Kaunas-Polish railway. A lot of work has been done since, but progress has been rather sluggish. There have been two major challenges: Time and Vilnius.

Time is running, and deadlines for setting up the Rail Baltic joint company have come and gone. The previous unconditional deadline was the end of 2013, but that one was missed. The current target is to launch the joint company in August and deliver the Connecting Europe Facility finance application in September. At the moment this target looks rather ambitious.

Time is running out because of Vilnius. In July 2013 Minister of Transport Rimantas Sinkevičius expressed a wish that Rail Baltic could also include Vilnius, and even in December 2013 Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevicius referred to the Vilnius line merely as ”more of a bargaining point”. In less than one year this humble wish has evolved into the decisive factor of the whole Rail Baltic project.

Transport Ministry of Lithuania has worked diligently to get Vilnius added to the current Rail Baltic project. Hats off to Mr. Sinkevičius and his team: They have skillfully and aggressively utilized every negotiation tactic in the book, and thus managed to outsmart their negotiating parties.

The Lithuanian Master Class of Getting What You Want in a Negotiation

• Lesson 1: In September 2013 the Rail Baltic working groups were looking for a consensus on the main issues of establishing the joint company. Transport ministers of Baltic countries, Poland and Finland were eventually invited to sign a joint declaration on September the 16th. Just a couple of hours before the proposed press conference, the Lithuanians announced that the signing ceremony would be cancelled, due to different views on Vilnius connection. Eventually Estonia gave up, and after some adjustments to the text, Transport Ministers Parts of Estonia and Matiss of Latvia signed the declaration.
• Lesson 2: During spring 2014 the Transport Ministry of Lithuania gave several public statements to the tune of “Estonian Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications recognized Vilnius as part of Rail Baltica”. On 18.6.2014 the final compromise was (believed to be) officially reached, and Prime Ministers of Baltic countries were invited to sign a joint statement on Saturday 21.6.2014. However, in the evening of 20.6.2014 Prime Minister Butkevicius threatened that Lithuania will not sign the paper, unless certain clauses on Vilnius connection were added in it. Once again Estonia capitulated, and on the next day Prime Ministers Roivas of Estonia and Straujuma of Latvia did sign the joint statement.

In both cases ministers from Estonia and Latvia signed declarations or joint statements, which contain several indefinite clauses about adding Kaunas-Vilnius -connection to current Rail Baltic project, and even getting 85 % financing for it from Connecting Europe Facility. Signing these papers will unfortunately make finding the proper wording for the shareholder agreement a rather demanding task.

Two views on Vilnius
There are two different interpretations of the 21.6.2014 statement.

Estonians have nothing against the Vilnius connection per se, assuming that the EU financing is in place. Unfortunately the financing can’t be settled until the feasibility study on Kaunas-Vilnius -connection has been completed and the project has been found eligible for EU financing and the decisions have been made in Brussels. That would take several years. Another Estonian prerequisite is that the preparation of Vilnius connection may not slow down the work on the main line, which leads via Kaunas to Poland.

The Lithuanian view is, however, very different. According to Ričardas Slapšys of Transport Ministry of Lithuania, “Stipulation of Vilnius in the shareholders’ agreement commits all three countries to seek and obtain European funding for this part”. Dainius Budrys, the CEO of Lithuanian Rail Baltica Statyba, has stated “I think the successful completion of the negotiations in the near future will lead to establishing a joint venture in the Baltic states, but how soon it will be done - depends on the Latvians and Estonians.” It seems that the Lithuanians know what they want, and they also seem to know how to get it.

Rail Baltic’s future looks dim
If Lithuania sticks to its claim that the construction and CEF financing of Kaunas-Vilnius connection should be included in the original Rail Baltic contract, the future of Rail Baltic does not look good. A shareholder agreement with such clauses cannot be signed anytime soon. The EU financing decisions are onerous processes that take a lot of time, and amending the EU regulation in order to reallocate the financing makes things even more complicated.

The negotiation teams of the Baltic countries are currently working on the shareholder agreement, and a lot of work needs to be done to solve the disputes between Estonia and Lithuania. It would be great if the joint company would be established in August, and the financing application for Connecting Europe Facility could be delivered in September. Unfortunately Estonia’s Rail Baltic project leader Indrek Sirp as well as EC’s Rail Baltic coordinator Pavel Telička have both recently resigned, which won’t make things any easier.

The whole Rail Baltic project is in jeopardy now. The 3 Billion euros earmarked for this project may be used somewhere else, if the Baltic countries are not able to leave the joint application for Connecting Europe Facility in September. There are EU countries who would be willing to accept 3 Billion euros financing from EU in a blink of an eye, and they would definitely deliver the financing application in Brussels without delay.

Esa Nurkka

The writer is an independent observer from Finland, whose comments and views are based solely on information available on public internet sites, mainly The Lithuania Tribune and the Ministry of Transport and Communication of Lithuania’s web site.


Links to useful background information:

• TEN-T priority project 27 Rail Baltic
• AECOM's Feasibility Study on Rail Baltic (2011)
• Rail Baltic Growth Corridor strategy report (2013)
• Pavel Telicka's Rail Baltic report (2012)
• Pavel Telicka's Rail Baltic report (2013)
• Rail Baltic declaration signed by the Baltic Transport Ministers on 16.9.2013
• Rail Baltic joint statement signed by the Baltic Prime Ministers on 21.6.2014

1. Suomen työeläkejärjestelmä

Helmikuu 2014

Suomen osittain rahastoiva työeläkejärjestelmä perustuu vuonna 1962 voimaan astuneeseen Suomen työeläkelakiin eli TELliin. Eläkevastuiden arvioitu määrä on noin 600 miljardia euroa, ja niistä on tällä hetkellä rahastoituna noin 25 prosenttia. Järjestelmä on hyvä, mutta uudistustyötä on tehtävä koska toimintaympäristö muuttuu jatkuvasti.

Historioitsija Teemu Keskisarjan Talouselämän artikkelissa lanseeraama "suomalainen ylihuomisesta huolehtimisen kulttuuri" on aatteellinen pohja, joka on mahdollistanut eläkevarojen pitkäjänteisen kasvattamisen. Pahan päivän varalle säästäminen on ollut näillä leveysasteilla oleellinen osa hengissä pysymisen strategiaa jo vuosisatojen ajan, ja varsinkin vanhempien ikäluokkien edustajat edelleen arvostavat tätä perinnettä.

Käsittelen näissä kirjoituksissa eräitä Suomen työeläkejärjestelmän osa-alueita. Pääpaino on ulkoisen toimintaympäristön muutoksessa sekä sijoitustoiminnassa. Sen sijaan aktuaarien toimenkuvaan kuuluvat eläkeikää ja maksettavan eläkkeen suuruutta koskevat pohdinnat jätän suosiolla vähemmälle. 

Tässä kevyt executive summary:

1. Suomen työeläkejärjestelmän toimintaympäristö: Digitalisoituminen (automaatio, robotisaatio, tietoverkot, keinoäly) mullistaa ”työnä pidettävän” toiminnan luonteen, mutta silti töitä tehdään ja työehdoista neuvotellaan enimmäkseen perinteisen maanantaista perjantaihin aamusta iltaan -puurtamisen pohjalta. Reaalitalouden ja finanssitalouden välisen suhteen muuttumiseen täytyy kiinnittää huomiota. Suurten ikäluokkien eläköitymistä ei pidä nähdä vain suurena ongelmana, jonka ainoa ratkaisu on eläkeiän nostaminen.
2. Suomen työeläkejärjestelmän rahavirrat: Työeläkevarallisuuden hoito on 50 vuoden aikana edennyt kotimaan rahoitustarpeiden hoitamisesta kansainväliseen sijoitustoimintaan, ja viime vuosina finanssielvytyksen aallonharjalla surfaamiseen.
3. Työeläkeuudistus 2017: Työurien pidentämisen ja paksuntamisen ohella pitäisi kiinnittää enemmän huomiota työelämän välttämättömän muutoksen vauhdittamiseen. Vuorotteluvapaan ehdoista kinaaminen ja työeläkemaksujen desimaaleista vääntäminen on merkityksetöntä, jos samaan aikaan laiminlyömme ympäristön muutokseen reagoimisen ja annamme työllisyyden romahtaa.
4. Työeläkealan tuleva toimintaympäristö: Työeläkealan ulkoisen toimintaympäristön kehitysvaihtoehtojen hahmottelua

1.1 Maailma muuttuu

Helmikuu 2014

Meillä menee Suomessa vielä kohtuullisen hyvin. Teollisuustyöpaikkojen hupenemisesta huolimatta työttömyysaste ei ole vielä hälyttävän korkea, mutta siitä saamme kiittää ennen kaikkea massiivista joukkoa työllistävää julkista sektoria sekä suurten ikäluokkien eläköitymistä. Rakenteellisilla uudistuksilla on todellisuudessa kiire.

Tilastokeskuksen tutkimuspäällikkö Anna-Maija Lehto esitti 28.2.2014 Helsingin Sanomien Vieraskynä-kirjoituksessaan tällaisia näkemyksiä:

"Tietokoneistumisen vaikutuksia on seurattu Suomessa 1980-luvun alusta lähtien. Silloin oletettiin, että toimistoalan töitä ja teollisuustyötä häviää paljon. Automaatio hävitti Suomessa työtä teollisuudesta, mutta toimistotyöt lisääntyivät. Vain pankkitoimihenkilöiden määrä väheni selvästi 1990-luvulla."

"Tietokoneistumiseen ja robotisoitumiseen on jo parikymmentä vuotta liitetty uhkakuvia ammattien vaihtamisen pakosta. Tilastokeskuksen työolotutkimusten mukaan niiden osuus, jotka ovat olleet lähes aina samassa ammatissa, on kuitenkin pysynyt yli 30 vuosikymmentä 40 prosentissa palkansaajia."

Digitalisaatio (tietokoneistuminen, automatisointi, robotisointi, keinöäly) on muuttanut maailman pysyvästi, ja Anna-Maija Lehdon havainnot kertovat vain siitä, että nyt on kiire! Ankea arki iski Neuvostoliittoonkin, vaikka "työtä" riitti kaikille eikä työpaikkojakaan juuri tarvinnut vaihdella.

Tosiasia on että merkittävä osa teollisuustyöpaikoista on kadonnut Suomesta. Tuotantoteknologian edelleen kehittyessä osa teollisuustuotannosta saattaa palata takaisin Suomeen, mutta vain jos olemme valmiit omaksumaan uudenlaisen tavan tehdä töitä. Kerran kadonnut (teollisuus)työpaikka on pysyvästi poissa, ja sen tilalle mahdollisesti syntyvä uusi työ on jotain muuta kuin ennen. 

Nyt on meneillään teollistumiseen verrattavissa oleva murros. Höyrykone käynnisti teollisen vallankumouksen 1700-luvulla, Henry Ford kehitti liukuhihnan sata vuotta sitten, ja älyn lisääminen tuotantolinjoihin on moninkertaistanut tuottavuuden kaikessa kokoonpanoteollisuudessa. Sama kehitys on tapahtumassa myös toimihenkilötyössä. Matkatoimistovirkailijoiden ja pankkitoimihenkilöiden työ on jo muuttunut, mutta hitaammin reagoivilla toimialoilla muutos on vasta alkamassa. Keinoälysovellukset tulevat hoitamaan yhä vaativampia rutiinitehtäviä, ja ihmisille jää tehtäväksi "korkeamman jalostusasteen" tehtäviä, mitä ne sitten lienevätkään.

Jos kuvittelemme että Suomi kyllä pärjää kunhan vaan vedämme vyötä kireämmälle ja odottelemme kärsivällisesti parempia aikoja, niin pieleen menee. Naapureistakaan meidän ei kannata katsoa suoraan mallia. Suomi on ainutlaatuinen maa ainutlaatuisine osaamisineen, ja meidän menestysreseptimme tulee myös olla omaleimaisen suomalainen. 

1.2 Reaalitalous ja sijoitusmarkkina

Helmikuu 2014

Työeläkeasioiden kannalta oleelliset talousasiat voidaan jakaa reaalitalouteen ja siitä johdettuun sijoitusmarkkinaan. Reaalitalouden puolella työeläkeyhtiöiden toimintaympäristönä on tiukasti rajattu Suomen kansantalous, kun taas työeläkevarojen sijoittamisessa pelikenttänä on koko globaali sijoitusmarkkina. 

Reaalitalous on se mitä oikeasti tehdään: Fyysisiä tuotteita tai palveluita tai jotain siltä väliltä. Taloutta voivat kasvattaa väestönkasvu, investoinnit sekä innovaatiot ja teknologian kehitys, ja ihan vaan ahkeruus. Reaalitalouden kuntoon läheisesti liittyvä työllisyysaste on työeläkejärjestelmän kestävyyden kannalta elintärkeä asia, siitä riippuu kerättävien työeläkemaksujen määrä.

Reaalitalouden volyymin lisäksi myös tekemisen laadulla on merkitystä. Maailman muutoksen myötä elinkeinoelämän rakenteet muuttuvat, eikä vääjäämätöntä kehitystä vastaan kannata taistella härkäpäisesti. Jos työllisyyden ylläpitämien perustuu siihen että merkittävä osa työvoimasta tekee huonosti tuottavaa tai jopa tarpeetonta työtä, on tulevaisuudessa odotettavissa vaikeuksia.

"There is nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at all." (Peter Drucker)

Sijoitusmarkkinaa ovat arvopaperimarkkinat pörssiosakkeineen, korkoinstrumentteineen, kiinteistöineen, valuuttoineen ja niistä rakennettuine johdannaisineen. Työeläkevarojen sijoitustuotot riippuvat näiden markkinoiden kehityksestä. Finanssikriisin jälkeiset vuodet ovat olleet sijoitustoiminnan hoitamisen kannalta suotuisia, vaikka reaalitalous etenkin Euroopassa on käynnistynyt yskähdellen. Työeläkevarojen hoidosta vastaavien sijoitusjohtajien tilannetta on helpottanut myös se, että heillä on mahdollisuus sijoittaa globaaleille finanssimarkkinoille, kun taas eläkeyhtiöiden varsinainen eläkeliiketoiminta on tiukasti sidoksissa Suomeen ja Suomen talouteen.

Pätevän ennusteen tekeminen tulevaisuudesta on mahdotonta, joten varautuminen erilaisiin tulevaisuudenkuviin on tarpeen. Vanhasta maailmasta tuttujen taloussyklien aikaan säännöllisesti toistuvine nousu- ja laskukausineen ei liene enää paluuta, joten kärsivällinen vanhojen hyvien aikojen paluun odottelu on huono vaihtoehto.

1.3 Demografia

Helmikuu 2014

Väestön vanheneminen rasittaa Suomen työeläkejärjestelmää, mutta ikääntyminen ei ole pelkästään kielteinen asia. Suurten ikäluokkien eläköitymisen ansiosta Suomen työttömyysaste on pysynyt siedettävällä tasolla monien toimialojen työpaikkojen vähenemisestä huolimatta.

Demografiset tekijät kuten ikääntyminen ovat yksi keskeisistä muutostekijöistä työeläkealan toimintaympäristössä, mutta (toisin kuin talousasiat) ne etenevät yleensä tasaisesti ennusteiden mukaan. Tiedämme että tällä hetkellä 55-59-vuotiaiden ikäluokka on 10 vuoden kuluttua 65-69-vuotiaita, ja luonnollisen poistuman määräkin voidaan arvioida kohtuullisen tarkasti. Nyky-Suomessa eivät sodat, kulkutaudit tai nälänhädät murjo väestöpyramidia uuteen uskoon, eikä maahan/maastamuuttokaan aiheuta ikäluokkien kokoihin äkkinäisiä muutoksia.

Työeläkealalla ihmiselämän olennaisimpana asiana pidetään työuria ja niiden pituutta. Kuinka vikkelästi etenemme koulun penkiltä työelämään, kuinka monta tuntia viikossa paiskimme töitä, ja kuinka pitkään jaksamme pakertaa duunissa ennen eläkkeelle jäämistä.

Työuran jälkeisen eläkkeelläoloajan pituus on myös syytä huomioida. Vuonna 1962 miesten eliniän odote Suomessa oli 65 vuotta ja naisten 73 vuotta. Näillä spekseillä ei 65-vuotiaana eläkkeelle jäävän kansalaisen eläkkeiden maksaminen ollut suuren suuri haaste, varsinkaan kun siihen aikaan eläkkeelle jäävät ikäluokat olivat varsinkin miesten puolella kovin pieniä.

Kuten yllä olevasta Eläketurvakeskuksen laatimasta väestöpyramidista näkyy, tilanne on nyt toisenlainen. Vuosina 1948-1957 syntyneet eli 55-59 ja 60-64 vuotiaat ovat suurin ikäluokka Suomessa. Tämän ennenäkemättömän terveen ja elinvoimaisen eläkeläisjoukon aiempaa pidempi eläkkeennauttimisjakso tulee rasittamaan työeläkejärjestelmän maksukykyä, ja siihen valmistautuminen aloitettiinkin Teivo Pentikäisen johdolla jo yli 50 vuotta sitten.

Suurten ikäluokkien eläköityminen tulee kalliiksi maksettavien eläkkeiden määrän kasvaessa, mutta sillä on myös positiivisia vaikutuksia. Aktiivisten, elinvoimaisten ja varakkaiden eläkeläisten lisääntyvä rahankäyttö luo myös omalta osaltaan luoda taloudellista aktiviteettia, ja eläkeläisten maksamat tuloverot sekä arvonlisäverot ovat merkittävä osa Suomen valtion veropohjaa.

1.4 Suomi ja muut maat

Helmikuu 2014

Eri maiden työeläkejärjestelmät ovat hyvin erilaisia, ja niiden keskinäinen vertailu on vaikeaa. Suomen tilanne ei kuitenkaan ole huono. 

OECD:n keräämässä aineistossa verrataan eri maiden työeläkevarojen määrää maiden BKT:hen, ja Suomen työeläkejärjestelmä on selvästi vahvemmalla pohjalla kuin esimerkiksi Ranskan eläkejärjestelmä. Finanssikriisien jälkeisten vuosien pörssikurssien nousu on kasvattanut Suomen työeläkevaroja kymmenillä miljardeilla euroilla, ja sitä kautta vahvistanut Suomen julkista taloutta.

Pitää kuitenkin muistaa, että työeläkevarat eivät lähtökohtaisesti ole mitään erillistä, pahan päivän varalle sukanvarteen piilotettua pääomaa. Suomen työeläkevarat ovat tärkeä osa Suomen julkisen talouden vakavaraisuutta, ja ilman niitä Suomen AAA-luottoluokitus valtionvelasta maksettavine mataline korkoineen olisivat muisto vain.

Monissa maissa työeläkevaroja on ohjattu poliittisilla päätöksillä valtion budjetin tilkkeeksi. Varoja on joko suorastaan "sosialisoitu", tai lievemmissä tapauksissa kanavoitu esimerkiksi infrastruktuurihankkeisiin antamalla eläkeyhtiöille erittäin hyvin perusteltuja suosituksia sijoituskohteista.

2 Suomen työeläkemiljardit

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Työeläkepottia kasvattavat työnantajilta, työntekijöiltä sekä valtiolta perittävät työeläkemaksut. Varojen arvoa vähentävät puolestaan ulos maksetut eläkkeet sekä eläkejärjestelmän hallinnoimisesta aiheutuvat kulut. Suurimmat heilahtelut eläkevarojen määrään aiheutuvat kuitenkin sijoitustoiminnasta.

Sisään tulevat eläkemaksut ja ulos maksettavat eläkkeet ovat olleet viime aikoina suurin piirtein saman suuruiset. Sijoitustoiminnan tulos on ollut useimmiten vuositasolla positiivinen, mutta vuodet 2008 ja 2011 olivat miinusmerkkisiä.

Eläkkeensaajien määrän kasvaessa vuosikymmenien aikana karttuneita eläkesäästöjä aletaan nyt käyttää eläkkeiden maksamiseen, mutta juuri tätä tarkoitusta varten koko työeläkejärjestelmä alun perin rakennettiinkin. Sodan jälkeen syntyneiden suurten ikäluokkien eläköitymisen aikataulu tiedettiin TEL-järjestelmää suunniteltaessa 1960-luvun alussa, mutta ihmisten radikaalisti pidentynyt eliniän odote ja siitä seuraava eläkkeennauttimisajan pitkittyminen ovat tuoneet eläkejärjestelmälle uusia haasteita.

2.1 Tuottavaa ja turvaavaa sijoittamista 1962-2013

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Eläkevarojen hoitamisen ylin ohjenuora on lakiin kirjattu määräys, että varoja tulee hoitaa tuottavasti ja turvaavasti. Oikean balanssin löytäminen tuottavuuden ja turvaavuuden välillä ei ole helppoa, mutta Suomen työeläkejärjestelmän voidaan sanoa onnistuneen tässä asiassa hyvin.

1962-1992: Työeläkejärjestelmän alkuaikoina varoja "sijoitettiin" sinne missä rahaa tarvittiin, tärkeimmät kohteet olivat valtion lainat ja takaisinlainaus yrityksille. Rahamarkkinat olivat tiukasti säädellyt, ja TEL-takaisinlainaus olikin monelle yritykselle elintärkeä rahoituksen lähde.

Takaisinlainaus oli työeläkeyhtiöille ja koko kansantaloudelle kaikin puolin järkevää toimintaa. Reaalitalouden pyörät pysyivät pyörimässä kun yritykset saivat rahoitusta, ja samalla turvattiin työeläkejärjestelmään tulevien eläkemaksujen virran jatkuminen.

Säännelty ympäristö oli myös työeläkevarojen sijoittamisen kannalta vaivaton. Korkosijoitusten tuottoprosenttia ei tarvinnut miettiä, koska oikeat korot päätettiin Suomen Pankissa. Vielä 1980-luvulla Suomen vankiloissa suoritti ehdottomia vankeustuomioitaan joukko hyvää tuottoa pääomalleen hakeneita oman aikansa varainhoitajia (eli "rötösherroja"), joiden rikosnimike oli ylikorkotalletus.

1993-2009: Suomen markka laitettiin kellumaan syyskuussa 1992, ja rahamarkkinoiden vapauduttua yritysrahoituksen saatavuus parani. Työeläkeyhtiöt joutuivat hakemaan eläkerahoille uusia kohteita, ja sijoitustoiminta muuttui ammattimaisemmaksi.

TEL-yhtiöiden salkkuja muokattiin pikku hiljaa oikeaoppisesti hajautetuiksi portfolioksi, joissa osakesalkun rungon muodostivat kotimaiset suuryhtiöt. Osakesijoitusten paino nostettiin 2000-luvun alkuvuosina TEL-yhtiöissä 30-40 prosentin tuntumaan.

Julkisen puolen työeläkevakuuttajien salkkujen rakennus aloitettiin tyhjästä, ja niinpä Kevan ja VERrin salkut hajautettiin kansainvälisille markkinoille jo alusta lähtien. Keva ja VER saivat myös TEL-yhtiöitä vapaammat kädet salkkujensa riskitason säätämisessä, eli käytännössä niillä on ollut oikeus pitää salkkujensa osakepaino korkeammalla. 

2010-2013: Vuoden 2008 finanssikriisistä toivuttiin keskuspankkien orkestroimalla elvytyspolitiikalla, ja vuoden 2009 lopussa Suomen työeläkevarat olivat saavuttaneet finanssikriisiä edeltäneen tasonsa. Vuoden 2010 jälkeen pörssikurssit ovat jatkaneet iloista nousuaan, ja rohkea osakeriskin ottaminen on ollut tuottoisin sijoitusstrategia.

Kesällä 2011 osakemarkkinat tosin notkahtivat, kun hetkellinen huolestuneisuus Kreikan ja USA:n velkaantumisista säikäytti sijoittajat. Taitavat osakesalkunhoitajat ymmärsivät kuitenkin nopeasti, ettei osakepainojen alentamiseen ollut todellisia perusteita. Valtioiden velkaantuminen ei ole ongelma niin kauan, kuin keskuspankeilla riittää halua ja kykyä järjestää uutta rahoitusta.

2.2 Sijoitustuotot 2010-2013

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Eläkeyhtiöt tiedottavat tuloksistaan neljä kertaa vuodessa, ja tämä on yhtiöiden varsinaisen liiketoiminnan eli eläkkeiden hoitamisen kannalta tolkuttoman lyhyt ajanjakso. Koska luvut kuitenkin raportoidaan kvartaaleittain, niin eihän niitä malta olla tutkimatta. 

 

***Huom! Olen päivittänyt vuoden 2014 tuottoja yllä olevaan kuvaajaan.***

Tarkastelun ajanjaksoksi valitsin vuodesta 2010 alkavan 4 vuoden periodin. TELAn ja FIVAn ohjeiden mukaan työeläketuottoja olisi syytä tarkastella ainakin 5 tai 10 vuoden aikavälillä, mutta valitsemani 4 vuoden jakso on perusteltu, koska vuodet 2008 ja 2009 olivat finanssikriisin takia erittäin poikkeuksellisia.

Eläkeyhtiöiden raportoinnissa sijoitustuotot esitetään vuosittain 3, 6, 9 ja 12 kuukauden ajanjaksoista, luvut ovat siis vuositasolla kumulatiivisia. Tuottojen kertymisen kannalta on havainnollisempaa katsoa jokaista kvartaalia erikseen, joten olen laskenut eläkeyhtiöiden raportoimista (ja TELAn keräämistä) kumulatiivisista tuottoluvuista jokaisen kvartaalin tuoton erikseen. Tämän jälkeen laskin vuoden 2010 alusta kumulatiivisen tuottokertymän viimeisimpään raportoituun kvartaaliin asti, ja tein aineistosta graafin.

Kuvaajassa ovat mukana kuuden TEL-yhtiön lisäksi myös omissa sarjoissaan itsensä kanssa painivat Kuntien Eläkevakuutus ja Valtion Eläkerahasto. Keva ja VER voivat pitää erilaisen lainsäädännön takia salkkunsa osakepainoa korkeammalla tasolle kuin TEL-yhtiöt, joten niiden tuottoluvut eivät ole suoraan vertailukelpoisia TEL-yhtiöiden lukujen kanssa.

Kevan ja VERrin performanssiin on vaikuttanut myös niiden salkkujen suurempi hajautus Suomen ulkopuolelle. Keith Ambachtscheerin ETK:lle tekemässä selvityksessä arvioitiin, että Suomen kahdeksan johtavaa eläkesijoittajaa (kuusi TEL-yhtiötä sekä Keva ja VER) kärsivät viisivuotiskaudella 2007-2011 ulkomaisiin eläkelaitoksiin verrattuna noin 1,5 prosenttiyksikön tuottomenetyksen suomalaisten osakkeiden ylisuuren painon vuoksi.

Disclaimer: Lähdeaineistonani ovat ainoastaan eläkeyhtiöiden yhden desimaalin tarkkuudella julkistamat nimellistuotot, ja tarkempia kommentteja kunkin yhtiön yksittäisten kvartaalien onnistumisisten ja epäonnistumisisten taustoista voi lukea yhtiöiden tulosraporteista.

Vuoden 2014 alusta lähtien TEL-yhtiöiden kilpailukenttä on muuttunut, kun Eläke-Fennia ja Eläke-Tapiola yhdistyivät Työeläkevakuutusyhtiö Eloksi.