Rail Baltic Train - Finally Leaving the Station?

Esa Nurkka, 10.7.2015
 
The Transport ministers from Finland, Poland, the Baltic States and Commissioner Violeta Bulc signed a Joint Declaration on Rail Baltic on 22nd June in Riga. Although there are some vague compromises and even discrepancies in the declaration, it was enough to guarantee the half a billion euro financing, which will eventually kick off project Rail Baltic. The Connecting Europe Facility Committee made the formal decision to allocate financing for RB Rail in its meeting today.

A full transcription of the 22.6.2015 Joint Declaration with nurkkaresearch comments and analysis can be downloaded here.

The necessity of Rail Baltic
As stated in the Joint Declaration of 22nd June, Rail Baltic is “one of the most strategic missing links to the trans-European transport network”. Europe needs Rail Baltic, and the European Commission wants Rail Baltic.

The isochrone maps below (snipped from emptypipes.org, courtesy of Peter Kerpedjiev) show expected travel times by train from certain cities. It is clear that especially Finland, Estonia and Latvia are smoothly connected to Moscow by rail, while connections to south are practically non-existent. Countries up in the north would benefit greatly from Rail Baltic, while in Lithuania and especially in Poland the improvement would be less dramatic. 

It is not surprising that of the Rail Baltic partner countries, Lithuania and Poland are the ones that suffer from a severe lack of Rail Baltic motivation. In the Joint Declaration of 22nd June there are several paragraphs dedicated to challenges related to Lithuania, while Estonia is mentioned only as a name in the list of Rail Baltic partner countries. Although all the partner countries will benefit from Rail Baltic, the further up north we go, the bigger the motivation.

Although the Lithuanian Railways don't want to admit it, Rail Baltic's north-south transportation would substantially diversify the future risks related to transportation of east-west cargo. Lietuvos geležinkeliai, Latvijas dzelzceļš and Eesti Raudtee all make big business transporting Russian cargo via their Baltic Sea ports, but they can not count on that business ad infinitum. Russia is constantly investing to its ports at the bottom of the Gulf of Finland, and eventually that means bad news for the Baltic transito business.

Do we really need the whole Rail Baltic?
Commissioner Violeta Bulc stated in politico.eu interview in January 2015, that one must not forget the Big Picture: “I am a systemic thinker: if a small part is to be successful, the bigger system also has to be successful.” This is very true with Rail Baltic.

Currently it looks like the northern part of Rail Baltic in Estonia and in Latvia is proceeding nicely, while there are lots of uncertainties related to the Lithuanian and Polish sections. What if we get a top notch Rail Baltic connection in Estonia and Latvia, with an inferior or non-existent north-south  railway in Lithuania or Poland?

Let’s compare Rail Baltic with another cross border connection. The Øresund Link connects Sweden and Denmark with a combination of an 8 km bridge, 4 km of Pebber Island surface passage and a 4 km tunnel. What if the bridge and the Pebber Island had a double track high speed railway (as they do have in real life), but the tunnel section would only have a one track railway with 50 % lower speed limit?

You don’t need Excel to tell that such a curtailed Øresund Link would not work. The same goes with Rail Baltic. Constructing just a part of the Tallinn-Warsaw connection would cripple the connection and totally destroy its viability.

Conclusion
The Rail Baltic train is indeed moving now, and there is no stopping it. It’s just that we do not know when the project will be finished and what will be the cost. The worst case scenario is that the Estonian and Latvian sections will be finished by 2025, while Lithuania and Poland do their best to reallocate the Rail Baltic financing to other purposes.

Hopefully Commissioner Bulc with her black belt in taekwondo and expertise in fire walking can bring some balance to the Rail Baltic negotiation table. The Lithuanian Ministry of Transport with their ruthless negotiation tactics have set the tone in Rail Baltic "cooperation" in recent times, and the other partners have time and again been forced to comply with Mr. Sinkevičius' policies.

Anonymous sources within the European Commission have admitted that there was some extremely harsh criticism against Lithuania during the negotiations in late June. However, the final Joint Declaration as well as Ms. Trautmann’s impressive personal plea for Lithuania were eventually softened and polished.

The same goes also with this comment. The original text was longer and contained more colorful language, but to avoid diplomat crisis, I decided to publish only a censored version.

Rail Baltic - Aika astua Eurooppaan

Esa Nurkka, 20.5.2015

Kirjoitin Uudenmaan liiton toimeksiannosta selvityksen Rail Baltic -projektin taustasta ja nykytilasta. Raportti julkaistiin Newsbrokers Oy:n Hiljainen reportaasi^TM formatissa, ja sen voi ladata Uudenmaan liiton nettisivulta.

Ultra Running and Science: How Do They Blend?

Esa Nurkka, 23.4.2015

University of Zurich's Institute for Primary Care and Gesundheitszentrum St. Gallen have published “Pacing strategy in male elite and age group 100 km ultra-marathoners” report, which analyzes Biel 100 km race pacing strategies over time period 2000-2009. Despite the promising title, the content of the research is a letdown. The report is based on data from the race website, and it seems that, before moving into statistical analysis and conclusions, a bit more background research would have been in order.

In this review I have chosen some questionable issues from the report (direct quotes from the report are in italic red color) and comment on them.

Pacing strategy in male elite and age group 100 km ultra-marathoners (Knechtle-Rosemann-Zingg-Stiefel-Rüst, 2015)
The aim of the study was to investigate running speed over segments in male elite and age group 100 km ultra-marathoners competing in the 100 km Lauf Biel in Switzerland in 2000-2009. The dataset for the study was obtained from the official race website in January 2015, and running speeds for athletes were calculated from split time information from the three Time Stations along the route.

The method sounds appropriate, but unfortunately it seems like something went wrong.

 A quote from the report:
“Split times at three time stations (TS) TS1 “Oberramsern” (38 km), TS2 “Kirchberg” (56.1 km), and TS3 “Bibern” (76.7 km) were taken identically during the 2000–2009 period by using an electronic chip system… Since 1999, split and overall race times have been recorded by Datasport in the same manner.” [source: Pacing strategy…, page 2]

My comment:
Could it be that although the data has been recorded “identically using an electronic chip system” and “in the same manner”, the location of the chip mats has not been identical over the years?

 A quote from the report:
“There seems to be a trend towards even pacing after 2005, with more negative splits at the final segment before 2005." [source: Pacing strategy…, page 6]

My comment:
1. This is not a trend. As you can see in Figure 3, this is a sudden and inexplicable change in the data.
2. This did not happen “after 2005”, the change happened after 2003.
3. This kind of sudden change cannot be explained by “changes in training theory or trends” or "some ‘running guru’ advertising towards ‘putting some time in the bank’" or “dawn and a flat course”. Both the data from 2000-2003 (with an unprecedented amount of negative splits) AND the sudden change in 2004 are utterly implausible. This should have set alarm bells ringing.

It would have been easy to ask one of the Biel 100 km veterans, whether there had been a major change in 2004. The names of all the finishers can be found at 100km.ch web site, so that would have been easy to do.

I have never been to Switzerland, so in order to find out the truth, I had to spend half an hour digging the internet. The waybackmachine found older versions of 100km.ch website, and the outcome was not surprising.

TS3 has been in Bibern (76,7 km) only since the change of the route in 2004, while in 2000-2003 TS3 was in Gossliwil (82 km). The distance from TS3 to the finish line has been 23,3 km since 2004, but before that it was a mere 18 km sprint.

 A quote from the report:
“…using repeated measures one-way analysis of variance with Greenhouse-Geisser correction and Sidak’s multiple comparison tests… the effect of change in altitude on running speed was estimated using means of the Akaike information criterion… using one-way analysis of variance with Dunnett’s multiple comparison post hoc tests… calculated Cohen’s d using means and standard deviations…“ [source: Pacing strategy…, page 3]

My comment:
It is very easy to see that basic source data is seriously flawed, so running extensive statistical tests on this material is a waste of time. Actually, it is rather surprising that the flawed dataset somehow “survived” all these tests. 

The final verdict

The split time data used as the base of this report are seriously flawed. The data from 2000-2003 and 2004-2009 are not commensurate. Trying to identify trends from such data probably leads to flawed conclusions.


Disclaimer: I am not properly qualified to comment on scientific research, as I have no medical education and my expertise in sophisticated statistical methods is next to nothing. I am a pure amateur in these areas. Despite my academic limitations, I have done some (extremely simple and un-academic) research on pacing strategies in Spartathlon 2008 and Oxroad 100 miles 2013.

Rail Baltic - Looking For A Nonchalant Financier With Deep Pockets

Esa Nurkka, 24.3.2015
The Baltic States managed to submit the Rail Baltic finance application to the European Commission on the 26th of February 2015, but the process was not an easy one. Although the EU financing for this project has been earmarked for years, a positive financing decision can not be taken for granted. The Commission is expected to come out with their response on funding application - either positive or negative - in July or August.

MEP Zigmantas Balčytis of Lithuania is one of the most vocal Rail Baltic activists in Brussels, and his parliamentary question from the 22nd of January 2015 presents a concise summary of Lithuanian approach towards Rail Baltic. Mr. Balčytis' parliamentary question E-000924 [with my blue color debunking comments in square brackets amongst the text] is here:

Subject: Responsibility of the Baltic States' joint venture ‘RB Rail’ for distributing EU funds to implement the ‘Rail Baltica’ project  
Question for written answer to the Commission, presented on the 22nd of January 2015 by MEP Zigmantas Balčytis (S&D)

On 28 October 2014 the Baltic States set up a joint venture called RB Rail to handle implementation of the Rail Baltica trans-European rail network project. Early this year the joint venture has to apply to the Commission for funding for the construction work, but there is disagreement among the Member States implementing the project on the question of the most suitable recipient. Some are seeking to ensure that the designated recipient will be the RB Rail joint venture, whereas others maintain that the recipients should be each of the Member States participating in the project.

The latter camp fears that if it were designated the recipient, the joint venture, and not the Member States themselves, would determine which projects should be financed and which ones should not. [Rail Baltic is a multi-national project. In order to guarantee a coordinated implementation of the whole project, RB Rail (i.e. the joint venture) is in charge of scope management. Furthermore, all the participating countries should have a common understanding on the desired outcome of the project.] There is another risk which might arise, namely that two Member States in agreement, disregarding the interests of the rest, could, having secured the majority of votes in the joint venture, take decisions to finance and implement projects useful to them alone. [One of RB Rail’s essential tasks is to make sure that no country can favor its own projects to the disadvantage of other countries or the project’s entity. Any signs of questionable activities would constitute a prominent threat to the whole project.]

Such situations could hamper the implementation of this major European project, which could be delayed or even halted if Member States failed to agree or could not come to a joint decision. A case of this kind, in which no decision could be reached jointly, occurred in connection with the building of the common LNG terminal in the Baltic region. [Hamper, delay, halt? If such fears are realistic, the Connecting Europe Facility will have to judge the project weak, and deny any financing for it. One would have hoped that the Baltic states had learned something from the LNG terminal dispute.]

Does not the Commission believe that any decision of the kind described would run counter to the EU’s common interest and could impede effective development of the single EU railway area? Does it not believe that each Member State, taking into account that the project is a matter of common interest, should itself decide which projects it will implement on its territory using the funds allocated to it for that purpose? [The answer to question “Should each Member State decide itself which projects to implement on its own territory?” is a plain and simple no. In a multi-national project, like Rail Baltic, the funds must be allocated by the multi-national project organization, in this case RB Rail.]

Answer E-000925/2015 given on 3 March 2015 by European Commissioner for Transport, Ms. Violeta Bulc can be read here. 

The Risk
Estonian MEP Urmas Paet placed a parliamentary question on the state of project Rail Baltic on the 23rd of February 2015. Mr. Paet inquires whether the Commission believes that the project is still on schedule, and what are the greatest risks associated with the implementation of the project. Ms. Bulc has not yet given her answer to these questions.

Even without Ms. Bulc's answer we can state, that the major risk for project Rail Baltic seems to be the inferior credibility of the project organization. Just reading through the list of risks and hazards mentioned in MEP Balčytis' parliamentary question raises serious doubts, whether financing such a project, with seemingly no hope for over-the-border coordination and cooperation, would be worth the risk. It is rather surprising that such fear, uncertainty and doubt mongering comments about Rail Baltic come from a MEP representing a Baltic country, and not from a supporter of another project that would be competing for the same money.

The feasibility of Rail Baltic lays on the assumption that the whole project will be implemented. Successfully constructing two thirds of the proposed Rail Baltic would be as great an accomplishment as successfully digging two thirds of a railway tunnel. Lots of cost with very little benefits. 

The Baltic Trendsetters Club has awarded the Rail Baltic companies in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania a certificate for “setting up the RB Rail joint venture of the Tallinn-Kaunas European standard rail gauge railroad”. The winners of this award have showed exceptional boldness, persistence and creativity. Too bad that the “missing link” between Kaunas and the Lithuanian-Polish border is missing.

Source of the picture: Transport Ministry of Lithuania.

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If you are interested in a more elaborate analysis on Rail Baltic issues, please feel free to contact me by e-mail or via newsbrokers.fi.

The Derailed Rail Baltic

Esa Nurkka, 24.2.2015

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed RB Rail's shareholders´ agreement on the 28th of October 2014 in Riga. The Baltic joint company was needed to coordinate the Rail Baltic II project and to submit a joint finance application to European Commission. Unfortunately "one common finance application" proved to be too ambitious a target. While Estonia and Latvia had no problem with committing to it, the Lithuanians once again opted to stick to their very own agenda.


RB Rail’s Recent History

• 21.6.2014: The Baltic Prime Ministers´ Joint statement “stressed the importance to prepare and submit the joint Rail Baltic/Rail Baltica CEF application for the first CEF call for the project proposals to be opened in from September 2014 through February 2015”.
  
• 23.8.2014: The Baltic countries were supposed to launch the RB Rail joint company in Riga as a part of Baltic Way 25th anniversary celebration, but due to different views on shareholder agreement’s wording, the signing ceremony was cancelled.
  
• 28.10.2014: After onerous negotiations, RB Rail was eventually established in Riga. To get the signatures on the dotted line, some compromises were needed: 

o Estonia and Latvia did not want to carry any risk on the financing of Kaunas – Vilnius connection, and they got “each party co-finances the railway construction only within its territory” clause in the agreement.

o Lithuania wanted to get the “provision for Vilnius connection” in the contract, as well as the statement that “owner of the rail infrastructure in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia is the country in which the infrastructure is located”.

• 5.12.2014: The Prime Ministers of the three Baltic states met in Maardu, Estonia, in a Baltic Council meeting. Once again, to get the joint statement signed, compromises were needed:

o Estonia and Latvia managed to get the phrase “a fast conventional double track 1435 mm gauge electrified railway line with the maximum design speed of 240 km/h on the Route from Tallinn through Pärnu-Riga-Panevezys-Kaunas to Lithuania-Polish border” in the statement, and Lithuania’s Prime Minister, Ms. Laimdota Straujuma did indeed sign the paper. Lithuanian transport minister Sinkevicius would have probably refused to sign such a commitment, but luckily this meeting was on a prime-ministerial level.

o Lithuanian prime minister would not have signed the paper without the Vilnius clause, and thus “as proposed by AECOM study with a connection of Vilnius-Kaunas as part of the Route” was added to the statement.

• 19.2.2015: According to the Lithuanian Ministry of Transport and Communication’s press release, ”The joint venture of the three Baltic States, established last autumn, will coordinate the implementation of the project from Kaunas via Vilnius to Riga and Tallinn”. This raises two questions:

o Does “from Kaunas via Vilnius to Riga and Tallinn” really mean that to get from Kaunas to Riga, you need to visit Vilnius?

o Does “implementation of the project from Kaunas via Vilnius to Riga and Tallinn” mean that Lithuania does not intend to build a high speed dual track connection between the Polish border and Kaunas?

Money matters

RB Rail is going to apply for 461 million euros from the first round of financing. Estonia is looking for 191 million euros, Latvia 240 million euros and Lithuania 30 million. This financing is for preliminary studies, cost-benefit analysis and designing the route.

Besides the 30 million euros applied through the Baltic joint venture, Lithuania is applying separately for 160 million euros to be used for “acquisition of land for public purposes” as well as “construction and partial electrification of a rail section between Rokai and Palemonas”. It is easy to see why this 160 million application is not a part of the RB Rail application. Rokai – Palemonas -section is a part of the old rail Baltic I project, which has nothing to do with the high speed double track Rail Baltic II project or RB Rail.

Lithuania has also other reasons for a separate financing application. According to minister Sinkevicius, the bulk of Rail Baltic works in Lithuania will probably be carried out through the Lithuanian railway monopoly Lietuvos Geležinkeliai (never mind the EU procurement rules…), and the VAT on that work should therefore be collected by Lithuania, and not Latvia.



Rail Baltic: The Mother of All Bottle Necks?

Rail Baltic is one of the European Commission’s TEN-T Priority Projects, and its aim is to close the gaps between Member States' transport networks and remove bottlenecks that hamper the smooth functioning of the internal market. The current Rail Baltic 2 project and RB Rail are based on AECOM’s feasibility study.

AECOM's study suggests that a 728 kilometer double track 1435 mm 240 km/h railway would be constructed from Tallinn all the way down to the Lithuanian/Polish border. At the moment it seems that the Estonian and Latvian parts of Rail Baltic might be well on track, while the Lithuanians have shown very little interest in constructing the high speed Rail Baltic railway line connecting Latvia and Poland via Kaunas.

Minister of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Lithuania Rimantas Sinkevičius is going to meet Violeta Bulc, European Commissioner for Mobility and Transport in Brussels on 24th of February 2015, ie. today. It will be interesting to see how Ms. Bulc reacts to Lithuania’s initiative. If the chances of getting a proper Rail Baltic connection across Lithuania look slim, how could the European Commission award financing even for Estonia and Latvia? Rail Baltica's Estonian project manager Miiko Peris stated yesterday, that a common application has a better chance of being funded by the European Commission.

Rail Baltic with no connection to Europe would be purely and utterly infeasible.

UPDATE: Lithuanian Ministry of Transport announced in the evening that the meeting between Mr Sinkevičius and Ms Bulc was "constructive and efficient". They agreed that "the TEN-T Core network has to be developed mainly by establishing the cross-border missing links, and, therefore, the project “Rail Baltica” is one of the key components of it". Wow.

The most interesting piece of news can be found at the end of the press release: Lithuania will apply for a total of EUR 365 million of co-funding under the CEF cohesion envelope. We do not know what this actually means, but here is an educated guess: Lithuania will still apply independently for 165 million to finance Rail Baltic I project, and Lithuania's original 30 million euros stake in the RB Rail's pan-Baltic application has been raised to 200 million euros.